DAG-Based Attack and Defense Modeling: Don't Miss the Forest for the Attack Trees
|Title||DAG-Based Attack and Defense Modeling: Don't Miss the Forest for the Attack Trees|
|Publication Type||Journal Article|
|Year of Publication||2014|
|Authors||Kordy B.K, Piètre-Cambacédès L., Schweitzer P.|
|Journal||Computer Science Review|
|Keywords||Attack and defense modeling, attack trees, Bayesian networks, Graphical models for security, Quantitative and qualitative security assessment, Security measures|
This paper presents the current state of the art on attack and defense modeling approaches that are based on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). DAGs allow for a hierarchical decomposition of complex scenarios into simple, easily understandable and quantifiable actions. Methods based on threat trees and Bayesian networks are two well-known approaches to security modeling. However there exist more than 30 DAG-based methodologies, each having different features and goals. The objective of this survey is to summarize the existing methodologies, compare their features, and propose a taxonomy of the described formalisms. This article also supports the selection of an adequate modeling technique depending on user requirements.